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DIMINISHED RIGHTS OF PARENTS TO SEEK 
REIMBURSEMENT UNDER THE IDEA FOR 
UNILATERAL PLACEMENT OF THEIR CHILDREN IN 
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
Ralph D. Mawdsley, J.D., Ph.D. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Forest Grove School District v. TA.l has served to reframe 
the discussion of whether or not parents are entitled to 
reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Act 
(IDEA) for unilaterally placing their children in private 
schools.2 In Forest Grove, parents sought reimbursement for 
the expense of placing their child in a private school, even 
though the child had not been receiving special education 
services prior to the placement. In landmark decisions in 
School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of 
Massachusetts3 and Florence County School District Four v. 
Carter,4 the Supreme Court had determined that such 
reimbursement was permissible under the IDEA since it was 
not to be considered a damages award. Both Burlington and 
Florence County ruled on behalf of parents by focusing on the 
failure of the public school districts to provide appropriate 
services. As discussed later in this Article, four years after 
Florence County, Congress amended the IDEA to impose notice 
requirements on parents seeking reimbursement for their 
children's private school placements. 
Forest Grove has served to tighten the analysis as to 
whether parents are entitled to reimbursement, and, in effect, 
1. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Or. 2005), rev'd and 
remanded, 52:3 F.ad 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), af{'d, 557 U.S. 2:~0 (2009), remanded to 675 F. 
Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Or. 2009), af('d, 6:'38 F.i3d 12:34 (9th Cir. 2011). 
2. The term "unilateral parent placement" does not appear directly in the IDEA 
but is a concept derived from the federal statute, which refers to parents having 
"enroll[ed] a child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the 
consent of or referral by the public agency." 20 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(IO)(C)(ii) (2012). 
3. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 4 71 U.S. :359 (1985). 
4. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
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to make such reimbursement more difficult to obtain. The 
Supreme Court decision m Forest Grove introduced a 
balancing-of-equities approach for exammmg the 
appropriateness of parental reimbursement-an approach that 
has served to broaden the scope of judicial inquiry beyond a 
public school district's compliance with the IDEA and focus, as 
well, on the responsibilities of parents. Some of the issues that 
are now given prominence in the balancing process include the 
following: whether the parents have provided notice to the 
school district of their intention to place their child in a private 
school, whether the private school was equipped to address the 
child's disability, and whether the primary responsibility for 
balancing equities rests with federal district courts. 
Guarded optimism after Forest Grove that parental 
reimbursement for private school placement might be more 
readily available has not been realized,5 as reflected in post-
Forest Grove court of appeals decisions. The Forest Grove 
Supreme Court's affirmation of a balancing-of-equities process 
has suggested that the federal district courts will have an 
enhanced role in managing the process. 
In the most recent of the Forest Grove decisions, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed a federal district court decision that parents, 
after six years of litigation, were not entitled to reimbursement 
for placement of their child in a private school. This Article will 
address the following: (1) the pre-Forest Grove early ground 
rules from Burlington and Florence County regarding parental 
reimbursement, (2) Congress' post-Burlington and -Florence 
County IDEA amendments affecting reimbursement, (3) the 
effect of the balancing of equities on parental reimbursement, 
( 4) the efforts by federal circuits to furnish definition and 
meaning to the balancing-of-equities process, and (5) the role of 
federal district courts in managing the balancing process. 
5. Cf. Brianna L. Lennon, Cut And Run? Tuition Reimbursement and the 1997 
IDEA Amendments, 75 Mo. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2010) ("Forest Grove School District v. 
T.A. clearly shows that the U.S. Supreme Court favors the rights of parents of special 
needs children over the autonomy of schools.") with Perry Zirkel, Legal Currency in 
Special Education Law: Top Ten for School Leaders, 262 ED. LAW REI'. 1, 1 n.ilO (2011) 
("[Forest Grove] received considerable media attention, generally being hailed as a 
major victory for parents of children with disabilities. However, the issue was a narrow 
and relatively rare one, and the decision was inconclusive in terms of the ultimate 
outcome. Indeed, in this specific case, the parents ultimately lost on remand."). 
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II. BURLINGTON AND FLORENCE COUNTY: THE EARLY 
REIMBURSEMENT GROUND RULES 
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A. School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education 
of Massachusetts 
In Burlington, parents and the school district differed as to 
the nature of a child's disability and his appropriate 
placement.6 The school district designed an Individualized 
Education Program (IEP)7 for the student that set a goal for 
improvement in math and reading at only four months for the 
entire school year and provided only three hours of 
individualized instruction per week. The parents placed their 
child in a private school from which he graduated three years 
later. In ruling on behalf of the parents and upholding their 
right to reimbursement for the expenses associated with their 
private school placement, the Supreme Court determined that 
the broad grant of authority in the IDEA for a federal court to 
"grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate"S 
included reimbursement.9 The Court reasoned that it would be 
"an empty victory" if "conscientious parents who have adequate 
means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment" 
were informed several years after the judicial review process 
that their expenditures could not be reimbursed by school 
officials.lO "If that were the case, the child's right to a free 
appropriate public education [FAPE], the parents' right to 
participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the 
procedural safeguards would be less than complete."ll The 
Court characterized reimbursement not as damages but as 
"expenses that [the school district] should have paid all along 
6. See Burlington, 171 U.S. at 362 ("the Town [school committee] believ[ed] the 
source [of the student's learning difficulties] ... to he emotional and the [plaintiff] 
parents believ[edj it to be neurological."). 
7. 20 U.S.C. §1101(14) (2012) ("The term 'individualized education program' or 
'lEI'' means a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, 
reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 1411(d) of this title."). 
8. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). 
9. Burlington, 171 U.S. at 369. 
10. Jd. at :370. 
11. /d. 
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and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a 
proper IEP."12 In rejecting the district's argument that the 
parents had waived their claim to reimbursement by 
unilaterally placing their child in a private school before the 
end of the administrative due process hearing, the Court 
asserted that the IDEA did not impose a Hobson's Choice13 on 
parents either to leave the child in what may turn out to be an 
inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the 
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for 
reimbursement. The [IDEA] was intended to give handicapped 
children both an appropriate education and a free one; it 
should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those 
objectives.14 
However, the Court closed with a cautionary note: 
parents who unilaterally change their child's placement 
during the pendency of review proceedings, without the 
consent of state or local school officials, do so at their own 
financial risk. If the courts ultimately determine that the IEP 
proposed by the school officials was appropriate, the parents 
would be barred from obtaining reimbursement .... 15 
B. Florence County School District Four v. Carter 
The Supreme Court's Florence County decision reinforced 
the Court's position in Burlington that parents have a right 
under the IDEA to unilaterally place their children in a private 
school and a right to be reimbursed if the public school district 
failed to provide a FAPE.16 In Florence County, parents 
rejected a public school's IEP for their child classified as 
learning disabled, where the IEP provided that the child 
"would stay in regular classes except for three periods of 
12. Id. at 371. 
13. 0XFOHD ENGLISH DICTIONAHY (2d ed. 1989) ("The option of taking the one 
thing offered or nothing."). 
14. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372. 
15. !d. at 373-7 4. 
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1101(9) (2012). "The term '[FAPE]' means special education and 
related services that- (A) have been provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State 
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or 
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity 
with the individuali7,ed education program required under section H 11(d) of this title." 
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individualized instruction per week, and established specific 
goals in reading and mathematics of four months' progress for 
the entire school year."17 The parents requested an 
administrative due process hearing, which was eventually held 
at both the local and state levels18 for the public school.19 
While the hearings were in progress, the parents placed their 
child at the beginning of her tenth year of school in Trident 
Academy, "a private school specializing in educating children 
with disabilities."20 The student remained there for three years 
and graduated. 
In holding that the parents were entitled to reimbursement 
for the expenses associated with placing their child in a private 
school, the Supreme Court noted that a parent's choice of a 
private school was not subject to the same F APE requirements 
imposed on public schools. The Court observed that to apply to 
parents the F APE requirement that education in private 
schools be '"provided at public expense, under public 
supervision and direction' ... would effectively eliminate the 
right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington. "21 
Regarding the school district's claim that the parents should 
not be eligible for reimbursement because Trident Academy did 
not "meet state education standards" in that it "employed at 
least two faculty members who were not state-certified and ... 
did not develop IEP's [sic]," the Court succinctly declared that 
the IDEA's FAPE requirements "[did] not apply to private 
parental placements .... Parents' failure to select a program 
known to be approved by the State in favor of an unapproved 
option is not itself a bar to reimbursement."22 
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the public school 
district's financial concerns that permitting reimbursement 
where parents have unilaterally chosen a private school 
represents a hardship for the school district where, if parents 
17. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 10 (1993). 
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(l) (2012) (IDEA requires a two-tiered administrative 
review process by which a hearing is conducted by local educational agencies; in such 
case, ag!-,>Tieved parties must have the opportunity to appeal to the state educational 
agency (usually, the state department of education)). 
19. Florence Cnty., 510 U.S. at 10. 
20. Jd. 
21. I d. at 1:3 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (9)(A) (1993)). 
22. ld. at 14. 
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are not limited to state-approved private schools, "States will 
have to reimburse dissatisfied parents for any private school 
that provides an education that is proper under the [IDEA], no 
matter how expensive it may be."23 While acknowledging the 
financial hardship to public school districts, the Court 
admonished those districts that they can avoid the financial 
burden of reimbursing parents for unilateral placements by 
doing one of two things: "giv[ing] the child a [FAPE] in a public 
setting, or plac[ing] the child in an appropriate private setting 
of the State's choice."24 
The Court closed with two cautionary observations that 
were to provide the basis for subsequent lower court 
interpretations and the 1997 congressional amendments of the 
IDEA regarding reimbursement. The Court noted: 
[parents] are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court 
concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and 
that the private school placement was proper under the 
[IDEA] .... Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief 
under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the 
appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that 
should be required. Total reimbursement will not be 
appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the 
private education was unreasonable.25 
Thus, while the Court in Florence County directed its 
attention primarily at the failure of the public school district to 
provide a FAPE, it also laid the groundwork for examining the 
appropriateness of the parents' choice of private school. Also in 
its Florence County decision, the Court grasped the policy 
implications for public school districts if parents' private school 
choices were not also required to address the issue of 
appropriateness. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENTS TO THE IDEA CONCERNING 
REIMBURSEMENT 
Four years after Florence County, Congress intervened in 
the private placement debate and amended the IDEA, 
2a. !d. at 15. 
24. ld. 
25. Florence Cnty., 510 U.S. at 16. 
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declaring that parents had certain responsibilities to fulfill 
towards the public school districts if they expected the school 
districts to reimburse them for the cost of unilateral 
placements. Congress' directions regarding parental 
requirements involved both a requirement to furnish notice 
and a warning of possible non-reimbursement if the notice was 
not provided: 
(ii) Reimbursement for private school placement 
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously 
received special education and related services under the 
authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private 
elementary school or secondary school without the consent of 
or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer 
may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost 
of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the 
agency had not made a [FAPE] available to the child in a 
timely manner prior to that enrollment. 
(iii) Limitation on reimbursement 
The cost of reimbursement described m clause (ii) may be 
reduced or denied-
(I) if- (aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents 
attended prior to removal of the child from the public school, 
the parents did not inform the IEP Team that they were 
rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to 
provide a [FAPE] to their child, including stating their 
concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private 
school at public expense; or (bb) 10 business days (including 
any holidays that occur on a business day) prior to the 
removal of the child from the public school, the parents did 
not give written notice to the public agency of the information 
described in item (aa).26 
Although the 1997 amendments were somewhat lacking in 
the forcefulness of their warnings to parents, they did 
legitimize a standard and a process for examining the 
appropriateness of services and placement decisions of a FAPE. 
Nonetheless, the 1997 amendments have become as important 
for what they do not address as for what they do: 
26. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1112(a)(10)(C)(ii), (iii) (2012). 
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(1) the amendments speak to the public school's 
requirement to provide a F APE, but not to which party bears 
the burden of proof regarding the services necessary to satisfy 
a FAPE;27 
(2) while the public school is required under the IDEA to 
provide a placement in the least restrictive environment,28 the 
amendments are silent as to whether reimbursement is 
available if the parents' placement is more restrictive than the 
public school's (as it generally has tended to be);29 
(3) although the public school district is required to 
implement services specified under an IEP, the amendments 
are silent as to whether reimbursement could be denied if the 
parents' placement was not able to implement some or all of 
the services designed for the IEP;30 
(4) because the amendments focused on private school 
placements, it is not clear whether reimbursement is available 
for additional services purchased by parents if the child 
27. See Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Consol. Schs., 208 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 
2000) (rejecting parent reimbursement for cost of Loovas training at home where the 
parent had failed to carry the burden of proof of showing that public school"s IEP was 
inappropriate). But see Jennifer D. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 2d 120 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding parents entitled to reimbursement where they had satisfied a 
two-part burden of proof under Schaffer v. Wuest, 516 U.S. 19 (2005), that the public 
school"s IEP was inappropriate because it failed to mainstream a disabled student to 
the maximum extent appropriate, while the parents' private school choice was 
appropriate since it provided a lower pupil-teacher ratio); Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004) (in upholding reimbursement for parents' providing 
home-based Loovas instruction, the Sixth Circuit held that "[p]arents are entitled to 
retroactive reimbursement if the school district failed to provide the student with a 
FAPE and if the private placement chosen by the parents was reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits."). !d. at 866. 
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(5) (2012). 
29. See Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 114 F.:ld :l91 
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that parents' placement of disabled child in a private school 
that admitted only children with disabilities did not prevent reimbursement. The Sixth 
Circuit observed, "It will commonly be the case that parents who have not been treated 
properly under the IDEA, and who exercise the right of parental placement, will place 
their child in a school that specializes in teaching children with disabilities and thus 
will not satisfy the mainstreaming requirement. Adopting such a limitation on 
parental placements would therefore effectively vitiate that remedy."). !d. at 400 n.7. 
30. See Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 189 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that parents were not entitled to reimbursement for cost of private school 
where it did not contain a therapeutic setting provided for in the lEI'; "[p]arents who 
seek reimbursement bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement 
was appropriate, even if the lEP was inappropriate."). 
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continues in the public school's placement;31 
(5) the amendments are silent as to the issues of cost of 
residential placements, the failure of parents to provide notice, 
and the adequacy of the private facility in providing a 
meaningful educational benefit;32 and 
(6) the amendments are silent as to whether a parent could 
recover reimbursement for a child placed in a private school 
even though that child had never received special education 
services.33 
IV. FOREST GROVE'S INFLUENCE ON ADDRESSING PARENTAL 
REIMBURSEMENT 
A. First Ninth Circuit Decision 
Despite-and perhaps because of-Congress' rather 
ambivalent directive in its 1997 IDEA amendments, the Ninth 
Circuit's Forest Grove decisions have asserted judicial, as 
opposed to administrative,34 control over the balancing-of-
equities process. In the first Ninth Circuit decision, the court 
reversed a federal district court decision that parents of a child 
with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) were 
precluded from reimbursement for parental unilateral private 
school placement where the child had not "previously received 
31. See Mora v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 768 A.2d 901 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (a 
Part C case upholding reimbursement for a family that had "provided private services 
to supplement inadequate [Individualized Family Service Plan] services and the child 
[had made] progress toward her goals as a result of the combination of services"). Id. at 
908. 
:32. See Richardson lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.:3d 286 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(rewrsing federal district court $56,000 reimbursement to parents calculated from the 
date that the school district had reasonable notice of the parents' intent to place their 
child in the private school and ending on the date that the child was removed from the 
private residential school and remanding to district court to determine whether, even 
though the child's treatment at private residential facility was necessary to receive a 
meaningful educational benefit, the facility chosen by the parents was primarily 
oriented toward enabling her to receive a meaningful educational benefit). 
:33. See Frank G. v. Bd. of !~due. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that failure to have student in public school did not prevent reimbursement 
where public school placement would have involved a classroom with too many 
children). 
:H. The IDEA requires that claimants exhaust administrative remedies before 
seeking judicial remedies. Administrative rulings by hearing officers are subject to 
judicial review. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(t), (g), (I) (2012). 
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special education and related services under the authority of a 
public agency."35 The Ninth Circuit found that the district 
court's interpretation would not only have the effect of 
reversing Congress' and the Supreme Court's clear expression 
"that all children with disabilities have available to them a 
[FAPE],"36 but would lead to the absurd result that the parents 
of a child with a disability must wait (an indefinite, perhaps 
lengthy period) until the child has received special education in 
public school before sending the child to an appropriate private 
school, no matter how uncooperative the school district and no 
matter how inappropriate the special education.:37 
In place of a rigid interpretation of the IDEA, the Ninth 
Circuit substituted a balancing-of-equities analysis whereby 
the district court could consider various factors, such as "the 
existence of other, more suitable placements, the effort 
expended by the parents in securing alternative placements, 
and the general cooperative or uncooperative position of the 
school district,"38 on remand to address whether the parents 
were entitled to reimbursement. The court went further and, in 
its parting comment, observed that the district court was free 
to consider the hearing officer's finding that T.A.'s parents had 
sent him to their private placement, Mount Bachelor Academy, 
"not only because of his disabilities, but also for reasons 
unrelated to his disabilities (i.e., substance abuse and 
behavioral problems)."39 In effect, the Ninth Circuit implied 
that the balancing-of-equities approach could result in parents 
not being reimbursed, even though a school district failed to 
provide FAPE. Thus, if a hearing officer found that the primary 
reasons for private placement were a child's behavioral 
problems not considered to be the result of a disability, the 
parents might not be entitled to reimbursement. 
35. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). 
36. Id. § 1400(d)(l)(A) (emphasis added); see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. 
Dep't of Educ. of Mass .. 4 71 U .8. 359, 369-70 (1985). 
37. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd, 
557 U.S. 230 (2009), remanded to 675 F. Supp. 2d 106a (D. Or. 2009), aff'd, 6:-l8 F.ad 
12:-34 (9th Cir. 2011). 
38. Id. at 1089 (citing W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target J{ange Sch. Dist. No. 2:-l, 960 
F.2d 1479, 1186 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
:l9. Jd. 
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B. Supreme Court Decision 
Prior to the remand to the district court, the Supreme Court 
reinforced the Ninth Circuit's balancing-of-equities directive, 
noting in response to the school district's concern about the 
financial consequences of unilateral private placements that 
"courts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a 
reimbursement award if the equities so warrant."40 Because 
parents who place their children in private settings pending 
review proceedings do so "at their own financial risk,"41 the 
Supreme Court concluded that "the incidence of private-school 
placement at public expense is quite small."42 
C. Federal District Court Decision on Remand 
On remand, the federal district court rejected the parents' 
claim that, in the absence of abuse by a hearing officer, the 
court was required to defer to the due process hearing officer's 
decision, which, in this case, had directed reimbursement for 
the parents. The district court determined that, in interpreting 
the IDEA, while it must accept the facts as found by the 
hearing officer, it could "exercise ... independent judgment 
based on a preponderance of the evidence as to whether the 
legal conclusions reached by the hearing officer [were] 
supported by the facts."43 This district court assertion over the 
balancing-of-equities process was confirmed on the second 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, where the court of appeals noted 
that it could "reverse a district court's decision under an abuse 
of discretion standard only if the district court's decision was 
40. Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 247. 
41. !d. (quoting Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1998)) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
42. !d. See Brief for Nat'! Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting J{espondent, Forest Grove, 52:3 F.::ld 1078, 2009 WL 906567, at *13-14 ("The 
percentage of children receiving services under the IDEA in publicly funded private 
placements has not changed significantly over the last 2a years. Since 1985, an average 
of 1.'14'% of all children served each year under the IDEA were in private placements at 
public expense. For the past two years for which national data are available, in 2006 
only 0.97% of children with disabilities were in private placements at public expense 
(57,078 out of 5,888,227 children), and in 2007 the percentage was only 1.1::3% of 
children (66,648 children out of 5,882,8::35 children)."). 
1:~. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (D. Or. 2009), 
af{'d, 638 F.:ld 1234 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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'[1] illogical, [2] implausible, or [3] without support in 
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record."'44 
In effect, the Ninth Circuit's approach to the balancing of 
equities suggests that the primary decision-making body in 
that process is the federal district court. During their second 
review of the facts in Forest Grove, both the federal district and 
Ninth Circuit courts weighed the facts against reimbursing the 
parents. While the public school district's failure in Forest 
Grove to follow up on T.A.'s suspected ADHD under "other 
health impairments"45 weighed in favor of the parents, both 
courts found determinative the parents' decision to send T.A. to 
the private school "after he admitted to using marijuana on a 
fairly regular basis, was occasionally so drugged that he could 
not get out of bed or speak, made over $1,000 worth of 
telephone calls to sex talk lines, scanned Internet pornography 
sites, and ran away from home."46 As the district court 
pointedly observed, "ADHD and trouble with schoolwork were 
not among the reasons listed."47 
In its conclusion that "[t]he equities do not favor requiring 
the District to reimburse T.A.'s parents for a decision to send 
T.A. to a school because of his drug abuse and behavioral 
problems that are unrelated to his difficulties focusing in 
school," the federal district court also reflected on the parents' 
and school district's responsibilities under the IDEA: 
it is important to note that the District's responsibility under 
the IDEA is to remedy the learning related symptoms of a 
disability, not to treat the underlying disability, or to treat 
other, non-learning related symptoms. The District certainly 
cannot begin treating a student's underlying medical 
44. Forest Grove, 638 F.3d at 12:~8 (quoting United States v. Hinkson. 585 F.:ld 
1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en bane)). 
·15. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012). "Other Health Impairment" is defined in the 
Oregon Administrative Regulations to mean "limited strength, vitality, or alertness, 
including a heightened alertness to environmental stimuli that results in limited 
alertness with respect to the educational environment, that: (A) Is due to chronic or 
acute health problems (e.g. a heart condition, tuberculosis, rheumatic fever, nephritis, 
asthma, sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, epilepsy, lead poisoning, attention deficit 
disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, leukemia, Tourette's syndrome or 
diabetes); and (B) Adversely affects a child's educational performance." OR. ADMIN. K 
581-015-2000(4)(h) (2012). 
46. Forest Grove, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 
47. ld. 
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disability, whether it be ADHD or some other mental or 
physical disability. That responsibility rests with the parents 
and medical professionals. 48 
315 
In addition, the district court wove into the balancing of 
equities the cost of the parents' private choice, especially in 
light of the parents' failure to investigate other options.49 As 
the district court noted, the parents' private school choice cost 
$5,200 per month, which, if one were to consider the school 
psychologist's estimation of five to ten percent of the students 
in the Forest Grove School District suffering from ADHD, 
would cost "$1,428,000 to $2,964,000 a month, or $12,852,000 
to $26,676,000 a year, assuming a nine month school year."50 
D. Second Ninth Circuit Decision 
In its review of the second federal district court decision in 
Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
decision on behalf of the school district, reflecting on the broad 
discretion accorded federal district courts in reimbursement 
cases to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the 
evidence. Thus, the mere fact that parents may have had an 
equity factor in their favor does not require a district court, 
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, to rule on 
behalf of the parents.5l As the Ninth Circuit so succinctly 
expressed, the balancing of equities meant that "the district 
court was not required to award reimbursement to T.A. simply 
because T.A.'s enrollment in private school was motivated in 
part by his disabilities.''52 Thus, since T.A.'s private school 
enrollment was "motivated by reasons both related and 
unrelated to his disabilities, the [district] court could have held 
the non-disability reasons so outweighed the disability reasons 
18. /d. at 1068. 
19. !d. at 1067. ("'!'.A's parents do not appear to have done significant research 
into schools specializing in dealing with children with ADHD and depression to 
determine the best placement for T.A Instead they chose the first school mentioned by 
['I' .A.'s independent psychologist] and enrolled T.A. without even visiting [it]."). 
50. !d. at 1068. 
51. See 20 U.S.C. § 1115(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2012) (in an appeal from a hearing officer's 
decision to a court, the court, "basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, 
shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate."). 
52. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 6:38 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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as to make reimbursement inequitable."53 
What is apparent from the Ninth Circuit's second Forest 
Grove decision is that federal district courts have the authority 
pursuant to balancing equities to select the facts that are to be 
given greater or lesser emphasis for purposes of 
reimbursement. As a result, the Ninth Circuit found 
reasonable the district court's placement of greater emphasis 
on the parents' response of "inappropriate and oppositional 
behavior and drug use"54 to an application question about the 
specific event for selecting the private school, even though the 
parents had also referenced elsewhere in the application "T.A.'s 
academic difficulties and ADHD."55 The Ninth Circuit sought 
to assuage the sensitivities of parents who may feel punished if 
they seek private placements that "address 'all of their child's 
needs"'56 by observing that "in this case the district court's 
determination that T.A. enrolled at [the private school] due to 
his behavior and drug problems was not illogical, implausible, 
or without support in inferences which may be drawn from 
facts in the record."57 
V. POST-FOREST GROVE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS: WHAT 
DOES "BALANCING OF EQUITIES" MEAN? 
The Ninth Circuit in Forest Grove accorded to federal 
district courts within its circuit broad latitude in drawing legal 
conclusions regarding the facts as long as those conclusions 
were not "[1] illogical, [2] implausible, or [3] without support in 
inferences."58 However, the extent to which federal district 
courts have as much latitude in determining parental 
reimbursement as suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Forest 
Grove is not clear. Although the Supreme Court in Forest Grove 
endorsed the balancing-of-equities approach to addressing 
parent reimbursement disputes, the Court did not determine 
how federal district courts and courts of appeals are to 
interpret F APE in the balancing process. Perhaps reflecting 
53. Id. 
54. /d. at 1240 (quotation marks omitted). 
55. ld. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1211. 
58. Forest Graue, 638 F.:id at 1238. 
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the relative newness of this balancing-of-equities process, 
federal circuits have not necessarily been in agreement as to 
how much discretion to accord federal district courts. 
In C. B. v. Special School District No. 1,59 a federal district 
court in the Eighth Circuit reversed a hearing officer's decision 
that parents were entitled to be reimbursed for unilaterally 
placing their child in a private school, even though the district 
court agreed with the parents that the school district had failed 
to provide a FAPE for four-and-a-half years.60 However, 
finding that "[n]inety percent of the students at [the parents' 
choice of private school had] IEPs and the remaining students 
had some learning or attention issues,"61 the district court held 
that the private school was "not an appropriate placement for 
[the student] because it [did] not offer him an education in the 
least restrictive environment."62 Notwithstanding four-and-a-
half years of failing to provide a F APE, the parent placement63 
was found inappropriate because "the record [did] not show 
that the nature and severity of [the student's] learning 
disability could not be adequately addressed in the less 
restrictive public school setting."64 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court 
decision and ordered reimbursement for the parents for one 
year of private school placement. The Eighth Circuit found that 
the mainstreaming preference of the IDEA did not make the 
parents' private school choice an inappropriate private 
placement under the circumstances because the statute calls 
for educating children with disabilities together "with children 
who are not disabled to the maximum extent possible."65 In a 
sweeping statement, the Eighth Circuit declared that the 
parents in this case had a "right of unilateral withdrawal"66 
and a right to reimbursement for private tuition, so long as the 
59. C.B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011), reu'g 641 F. 
Supp. 2d 850 (D. Minn. 2009). 
60. C. B., 611 F. Supp. 2d 850. 
61. !d. at 856. 
62. /d. 
63. The parents furnished the school district with the notice required under the 
IDEA. See C.B., 636 F.:3d at 986. 
61. C. B .. 611 F. Supp. 2d at 856. 
65. ld. (emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2009)). 
66. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993). 
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placement was "proper under the [IDEA],"67and the award 
"further[ed] the purposes of the [IDEA]."68 Paying little 
attention to the district court's factfinding and legal 
conclusions, the Eighth Circuit held that "[r]eimbursement for 
the costs of enrollment in a private school is authorized if the 
hearing officer finds that the District 'had not made a [F APE] 
available to the child in a timely manner prior to that 
enrollment."'69 For the benefit of future federal district court 
decisions concerning parental reimbursement in the Eighth 
Circuit, the court of appeals aligned itself with "the Third and 
Sixth Circuits in concluding that a private placement need not 
satisfy a least-restrictive environment requirement to be 
'proper' under the [IDEA]."70 In effect, the Eighth Circuit 
altered the balancing of equities by eliminating one of the 
factors-the least restrictive environment-from the balancing 
process. 
The result of a balancing-of-equities process where a public 
school district has not furnished a F APE could be expected to 
change where the school district has furnished a F APE. In P.P. 
ex rel. Michael P. v. West Chester Area School District, 71 the 
Third Circuit upheld a federal district court decision (affirming 
a hearing officer and appeals panel) finding that, where a 
public school district had made available a FAPE to a student, 
the parents were not entitled to reimbursement. 72 The Third 
Circuit upheld the district court's balancing of equities that 
included among the complex facts of the case, a child who had 
never attended the public school, 73 a disputed written parent 
67. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 1\71 U. S. :l59, 369 
(1985). 
68. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, 557 U.S. 280, 21\2 n.9 (2009). 
69. C.I3. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981, 991 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing 20 
U.S.C. § H12(a)(lO)(C)(ii) (2011) (emphasis added)). 
70. Id. See Warren G. v. Cumberland Cnty. Sch. Dist., 190 F.:3d 80, 83-81\ (:3d 
Cir.1999); Cleveland Heights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 399-
1\00 (6th Cir.1998). 
71. P.P. ex rei. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.:3d 727 (:3d Cir. 
2009). 
72. Id. at 7:39. However, the hearing officer had awarded 102 hours of 
compensatory damages because of the school district delay in evaluation, an award 
that was reversed by the appeals panel and upheld by the federal district court and the 
Third Circuit. Id. at 737. 
7:3. See id. at 7:lO ("During the 2001-2005 school years, when he was in 
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notice to evaluate their child, 74 and a disputed IEP that 
contained most but not all of the evaluations requested in an 
Independent Educational Evaluation. 75 The most damaging 
factor in the balancing process against the parents, though, 
was the district court and Third Circuit's finding that the 
motivation for the parents' placement of their child in a private 
school was not due to his disabilities, but their having sent, in 
June 2005, 
a tmtwn deposit to Benchmark[, the private school, and 
having] financed the Benchmark tuition through AMS, a 
program that fronts the entire year's tuition to a private 
school and requires that parents repay the bank on a monthly 
basis, with limited opportunity for parents to opt out of full 
payment if their child does not attend the private school. 76 
Thus, while the student in P.P., unlike the student in Forest 
Grove, had "never enrolled in the [School] District in the first 
place,"77 the difference has no relevance where the school 
district in P.P. not only had provided a F APE, but the parents' 
motivation m pursumg a private placement had been 
impugned. 
Forest Grove, C.B., and P.P. suggest that the judiciary's 
equitable authority will fall on the side of school districts where 
they have furnished a FAPE. However, parents face other 
equitable trip wires in their claim for reimbursement besides 
the issue ofF APE. The Third Circuit, in C. H. v. Cape Henlopen 
School District, ruled that parents who have failed to provide 
kindergarten through third grade, Patrick went to a parochial school, St. Maximillian 
Kolbe .... During the summer of 2005, and in the 2005-2006 school year, when he was 
in fourth grade, he attended the Benchmark School ... , a private school for children 
with disabilities."). 
74. /d. at 737 (the Third Circuit found "not credible" the parents' claim that they 
had sent written notice in January 2003, determining instead that a November 22, 
2004 date which was the first one for which the parents had documentation of their 
demand). 
75. /d. at 7a2. The school district's refusal to provide a math evaluation was 
upheld where the child was performing at an average level and refusal to conduct 
assessments of their son's social and emotional function where the parents' report 
stated that their son was happy, social, and responsible, the evaluators found that the 
studl,nt was "pleasant, joyful, and engaging[, and his] teachers described him as 
positive and motivated." /d. at n.l. 
76. !d. at 7:~2. 
77. P.f'., 585 F.:ld at 739 n.4. 
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school districts with notice that they intend to place their 
children in private schools, as specified in the IDEA, may not 
be entitled to any reimbursement, even if the school has failed 
to furnish a FAPE.78 The 1997 amendments to the IDEA, as 
referenced above, allowed for reduction or denial of 
reimbursement for unilateral parental placement in a private 
school if the parents failed to provide notice of such placement 
"at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents attended 
prior to removal of the child from the public school."79 Citing 
Forest Grove, the Third Circuit in C.H. noted that "courts 
retain discretion to reduce the amount of a reimbursement 
award if the equities so warrant."SO Even though the Supreme 
Court's Forest Grove decision had not been handed down until 
after the district court decision in C.H., the Third Circuit, 
applying the equities to the facts, found the equities favored 
the school district's side where 
the Parents unilaterally withdrew C.H. from the District 
without any prior notice to the District[,] . . . [and where] 
delaying the continuation of the IEP meeting and cancelling 
the speech and language evaluation substantially precluded 
any possibility that the District could timely develop an 
appropriate IEP for C.H. and provide the necessary services 
to him, [so] that the parties could resolve this dispute without 
resort to litigation.Sl 
Giving full equitable force to the IDEA's parental notice 
requirement, the Third Circuit declared that "[t]he IDEA was 
not intended to fund private school tuition for the children of 
parents who have not first given the public school a good faith 
opportunity to meet its obligations."82 
However, even though the Forest Grove balancing-of-
equities standard can present challenges for parents seeking 
reimbursement for having placed children in private schools, 
the breadth of the discretion granted to federal courts can work 
to the parents' advantage, as well. In Ferren C. v. School 
District of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit interpreted Forest 
78. C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.ad 59 (:Jd Cir. 2010). 
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2012). 
80. C.H., 606 F. 3d at 71 (quotation marks omitted). 
81. /d. 
82. /d. at 72. 
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Grove as asserting that "the Supreme Court declined to limit 
courts' discretion in granting equitable relief under the 
IDEA."S:3 In Ferren, the Third Circuit, in the shadow of Forest 
Grove, addressed the authority of federal courts to apply an 
equitable remedy under compensatory education. In a 
somewhat complex set of facts, the student in Ferren had 
attended a private school from 2004 to 2007 with the costs 
being paid from a trust fund established by the school 
district.84 In 2007, the student turned twenty-one. The private 
school which she attended did not usually educate students 
past the age of twenty-one; however, it agreed to continue 
educating the student so long as the school district agreed to 
continue funding the student's education, which it agreed to do 
through 2010.85 
However, after the student turned twenty-one, the school 
district stated that it intended to graduate the student at the 
end of the 2007 school year since it had no further obligations 
under the IDEA once a student with disabilities turned twenty-
one.86 
The school district's decision presented two problems for the 
private school: (1) it could not graduate the student unless the 
school district notified it that public school obligations under 
compensatory education had been satisfied, a notification that 
the school district did not (and, presumably would not) furnish 
to the private school; and (2) the school district, while willing to 
continue to pay the private school tuition from the trust fund, 
would no longer provide IEPs or serve as the local education 
authority (LEA).87 Both the hearing officer and the 
administrative appeals panel found for the school district, 
ruling "that the School District was not required to provide 
Ferren with an IEP during the three-year compensatory 
education period."SS A federal district court reversed the 
8:l. Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 718 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'g 595 F. 
Supp. 2d 566 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
H1. !d. at 715. 
85. /d. 
86. /d. at 715-16. 
87. /d. at 715 (while the private school can prepare an IEP without the 
involvement of a puhlic school district, it required that a student's home school district 
sign the I El' and serve as the student's LEA). 
88. /d. at 716. 
322 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2012 
administrative decisions and "ordered the School District for 
the duration of her three years of compensatory education to 
annually reevaluate Ferren, provide her with annual IEPs, and 
serve as her LEA."89 The Third Circuit reviewed the district 
court's equitable remedy under an abuse of discretion 
standard.90 The court of appeals opined that, although 
compensatory education is "a judicially created remedy" not 
found in the IDEA, it falls within the equitable power accorded 
to courts under the IDEA.91 Thus, while the IDEA limits a 
school district's obligation to provide a F APE only to students 
under the age of twenty-one,92 an individual over that age is 
still eligible for compensatory education for a school district's 
failure to provide a FAPE prior to the student turning twenty-
one.93 To allow the school district in Ferren to fulfill its 
obligation to make up for past failures only paying for private 
school tuition would frustrate the very purpose of setting up 
the trust fund because "Ferren could not remain at [the private 
school] without the School District providing IEPs and serving 
as Ferren's LEA."94 The Third Circuit concluded that the 
equitable relief granted by the district court was "appropriate" 
under the IDEA because the District Court had weighed "the 
interests of finality, efficiency, and use of the School District's 
resources with the compelling needs of Ferren and her 
family."95 The court of appeals concluded that, based on the 
specific facts of this case, the equitable award was appropriate 
to further the purposes of the IDEA because it will "ensure that 
Ferren's educational rights under the IDEA are enforced and 
that she receives the education to which she was statutorily 
entitled."96 
89. Ferren, 612 F.3d at 716. 
90. /d. 
91. !d. at 717. 
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
93. See also Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
94. Ferren, 612 F.3d at 719. 
95. Id. at 718 (quoting Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila, 595 F. Supp. 2d 566, 578 
(E.D. Pa. 2009)) (quotation marks omitted). 
96. Jd. at 719. 
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A. Analysis and Implications 
Forest Grove sends a less-than-clear message to parents 
concerning reimbursement for unilateral placement in private 
schools. What is also unclear is how the Supreme Court's 
balancing-of-equities approach in addressing reimbursement 
cases will affect the relationships between hearing officers and 
federal district courts and between district courts and courts of 
appeals. Whether the Supreme Court's Forest Grove decision 
enhances the role of federal district courts as the guardians of 
public school district funds and their expenditure for unilateral 
parental placement in private schools remains to be seen. 
The balancing-of-equities process requires hearing officers 
and courts to determine two separate issues. First, a school 
district's failure to provide a FAPE must be balanced against 
the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of the parents' 
placement decision. In effect, reimbursement cases under a 
balancing process have a substantive aspect and a school 
district's failure to furnish a FAPE may not be, in itself, 
sufficient justification for reimbursement. 
Second, courts of appeals must decide what deference, if 
any, is due the decisions of the various administrative and 
judicial decision-makers that are part of the review process. 
Questions such as the relationship between procedural and 
substantive violations of the IDEA, whether parents have 
complied with the IDEA's notice requirements before placing 
their child in a private placement, and the appropriateness of 
the private school placement present both factual and legal 
issues. Defining the deference that a federal circuit court of 
appeals should provide to hearing-level and lower court 
decisions in post-Forest Grove reimbursement cases is far from 
clear. 
In Richardson Independent School District v. Michael Z.,97 
two months after Forest Grove, the Fifth Circuit reversed a 
hearing officer's $56,000 reimbursement award to parents plus 
an additional $54,714.40 reimbursement and $36,768.20 in 
attorneys' fees and costs by the district court. With only a 
passing reference to Forest Grove, the Fifth Circuit applied the 
de novo standard of review for questions of law and a "clear 
97. Hichardson Indep. s~h. Dist. v. Mi~hael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 301 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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error" standard for questions of fact. 98 In remanding to the 
district court, the Fifth Circuit instructed the court that, even 
though a school district had failed to furnish an IEP providing 
a FAPE, which resulted in the child's failed progress, the Fifth 
Circuit would not uphold the parents' residential placement 
unless they could prove not only that their placement was 
"essential in order for the disabled child to receive a 
meaningful educational benefit, [but also that it was] primarily 
oriented toward enabling the child to obtain an education."99 
The Fifth Circuit observed that "[the] IDEA ... does not 
require school districts to bear the costs of private residential 
placements" that are not essential for a disabled child to 
receive an education;lOO balancing of equities requires that 
parents produce evidence that their child's treatment at their 
placement choice is "primarily oriented towards [i.e., primarily 
designed for and directed to] enabling the child to receive a 
meaningful educational benefit."101 Thus, while the Supreme 
Court's balancing of equities in Forest Grove has affected a 
parent's burden of proof, Richardson suggests no change by 
courts of appeals in according a standard of review less than de 
novo. 
Approximately five-and-a-half months after Forest Grove, 
the Ninth Circuit, in Ashland School District v. Parents of 
Student R.J.,102 reflected on the appellate trip wires affecting 
parents seeking reimbursement. In Ashland, the court of 
appeals set out a balance between an administrative hearing 
officer and a federal district court in making findings of fact. A 
state hearing officer found that the school district had violated 
various procedural requirements of the IDEA between 2003 
and 2005 (one of which was holding an IEP meeting without a 
parent present, thereby failing to make a FAPE available to 
the student) and accordingly held that the parents were 
98. !d. at 291. See Teague Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 181 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (citing Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 9:J3 F.2d 12S5, 
1289 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
99. Richardson, 580 F.3d at 299. 
100. ld. 
101. !d. at 301. 
102. Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student ILJ., 588 F.:ld 1001 (9th Cir. 2009), 
aff'g 585 F. Supp. 2d 120S (D. Or. 2008). 
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entitled to reimbursement.l03 The IDEA provides that a 
procedural violation (such as a school district's failure to 
furnish notice to parents of an IEP meeting) can constitute 
denial of a FAPE only where such violation has "caused a 
deprivation of educational benefits to the child"l04 or 
"significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate 
in the decisionmaking process."l05 The hearing officer in 
Ashland allowed the parents reimbursement for only one of 
their two placements, reasoning that placement in the non-
reimbursable residential facility "stemmed from issues apart 
from the learning process, which manifested themselves away 
from school grounds."I06 In effect, the hearing officer 
determined that one of the placements had not related to a 
FAPE violation because it had conferred no educational benefit 
on the student. The school district appealed to a federal district 
court, which reversed the hearing officer's finding of failure to 
provide a F APE, in effect denying the parents any 
reimbursement at alL 107 The parents believed that the district 
court's decision was based on a too-narrow interpretation of 
"special education" and "related services."lOS The parents 
appealed, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court, 
determining that the IDEA provision authorizing federal courts 
to "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate"109 
requires district courts to conduct a "de novo review of the state 
hearing officer's findings and conclusions."llO The court of 
. appeals then applied the same de novo and clear error 
standards of review as used in Richardson to find that the 
federal district court "[had] not clearly err[ed]" in finding that 
the parents were not entitled to any reimbursement at all for 
placement of their child at either schooJ.lll In light of evidence 
in the record concerning the child in Ashland and her 
10::3. /d. at 1008. 
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1115(f)Ul)(l£)(ii)(II) (2012). 
105. !d. §§ 1115(t)(::l)(E)(ii)(lll). 
106. Ashland, 588 F.:cld at 1008. 
107. /d. (quotation marks omitted). 
108. /d. at 1009 (referencing ::31 C.F.R § aoO.l04 (2009)). 
109. !d. at 1008 (quoting 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2) (2009)). 
110. Jd. 
111. Jd. at 1010. The circuit court did, however, review the district court's 
interpretation of the disputed IDEA provisions de novo.ld. at 1009-10. 
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emotional issues and choice of friends, 112 the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the district court in its finding that placement in a 
residential facility was not "necessary to meet [the student's] 
educational needs."113 Thus, as in Richardson, the Ninth 
Circuit in Ashland applied the Forest Grove standard without 
altering the deference given to district court decisions. 
Almost two years after Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit in 
C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified School District, 
again used the de novo (applied to legal interpretations of the 
IDEA) and clear error (regarding the adequacy of 
interpretation of the facts of the case) standards to uphold a 
federal district court's reversal of a hearing officer's decision.114 
Applying its clear error test, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
awarding of full reimbursement for the parents, observing that 
"[o]ur focus is on the district court's decision, not the [hearing 
officer's] decision." 115 
The Ninth Circuit decisions in Ashland and C.B. upholding 
federal district court decisions limiting reimbursement 
(Ashland) and awarding full reimbursement (C.B.) present 
interesting possibilities as to whether the court of appeals 
would have reached the same results if the district courts had 
decided differently. Would the Ninth Circuit in Ashland have 
upheld a district court's order for full reimbursement, accepting 
the district court's reasoning that the child's emotional conduct 
outside of school affected the child's academic performance in 
school? Similarly, would the Ninth Circuit in C.B. have upheld 
a district court decision denying all reimbursement where the 
parents' placement was not able to meet all of the child's 
educational needs? Once a court of appeals finds no clear error 
112. Ashland, 588 F.ad at 1007. The student's mother described her daughter's 
emotional issues as follows: "I just think that there are some serious emotional issues 
that are going on here that are affecting her interaction with peers and her interaction 
with parents and her interaction with teachers. Going behind people's backs, not being 
trustworthy. Lying about things that are supposed to be done and not done or 
whatever .... She lies about things that have happened to her and gets kids in 
trouble .... And l really am worried about her. She's expressed some really risky, 
risky behaviors. l£xtremely risky behaviors including [her interactions withj the 
custodian." 
113. !d. at 1008 (quotation marks omitted). 
111. C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 6:l5 F.:id 1155 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
115. Jd.at1159 n.1. 
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in a district court's findings of fact (e.g., the identification of the 
student's disability, the conduct of the student, the student's 
performance in school, and recommended services), a circuit 
court's de novo review of the district court's placement decision 
still does not rule out a decision at odds with the district court. 
Other federal circuits have pursued their own 
interpretations of a de novo standard in a manner similar to 
Forest Grove. In a pre-Forest Grove decision, Muller v. 
Committee on Special Education of the East Islip Union Free 
School District,ll6 the Second Circuit, agreeing with a federal 
district court that a student plaintiff should have been 
evaluated as having a serious emotional disturbance instead of 
the conduct disorder diagnosed by the school district, upheld 
reimbursement for the parents.117 Even though the parents' 
placement was more restrictive than the public school offering, 
the Second Circuit agreed that the district court had correctly 
determined that the student should be allowed to continue in 
the private placement.l18 Although not using the words "abuse 
of discretion" in assessing the district court's conclusion, the 
focus of the Second Circuit was clearly and solely on the 
district court. The Muller result has been followed in other pre-
and post-Forest Grove decisions, with the Second Circuit 
holding that a federal district court, in a parental 
reimbursement case, is not required to grant any deference to 
administrative hearing officer rulings where "the district court 
is presented with the threshold question of a child's statutory 
eligibility for special education services."119 
However, to further complicate the task for parents, not all 
federal circuits follow the Ninth and Second Circuits' de novo 
approach for reviewing state administrative hearing officer or 
federal district court decisions. In Mary T. v. School District of 
116. Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ. of the E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 145 
F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1998). 
117. I d. at 1 ml. 
118. Jd. at 105. 
119. C.B. ex rel. Z.G. v. Dep't of Educ. of City of N.Y., 322 F. App'x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 
2009). See also P.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Brookfield Bd. of Educ., 186 F. App'x 79, 80·81 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (finding that district court had 1,rranted appropriate deference to 
administrative finding that rejected parents' claim for reimbursement and citing to 
Muller for the principle that "[djistrict courts arc to employ a preponderance of the 
evidence standard in evaluating IDEA petitions."). 
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Philadelphia, the Third Circuit reversed a federal district 
court's granting of partial reimbursement after a state hearing 
panel had ruled that the parent plaintiffs were not entitled to 
any reimbursement.120 In reversing the district court, the court 
of appeals reasoned that the Third Circuit mandated a "due 
weight" standard requiring federal district courts to consider 
the "[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings ... 
prima facie correct," and if they fail to adopt those findings, the 
courts must explain their reasons for departing from them.121 
Unfortunately, most of the federal circuits have yet to 
interpret Forest Grove's "equitable principles"122 in IDEA 
parental reimbursement cases or to determine the appropriate 
standard for reviewing federal district court decisions. In both 
Ferren C. and Ashland, where federal district courts reversed 
hearing officer decisions (in favor of the school district and the 
parents, respectively), the Third and Ninth Circuits upheld the 
district courts. In Richardson, where the Fifth Circuit 
remanded a district court decision and vacated an order 
favorable to the parents, it did so not on the merits, but solely 
to enable the district court to address the question of whether 
the parents' placement was necessary for their child's 
educational benefit. 
The "equitable principles" or "balancing of equities" 
advocated by the Supreme Court in Forest Grove furnish no 
direction as to what the equities are and who is to have the role 
of interpreting and applying them. Thus far, case law furnishes 
little direction for public schools and parents. The cases 
suggest that although parents may not be successful in some of 
the cases, it is too early for school districts to have some 
measure of comfort that the Court's equitable principles are a 
way of raising the bar for reimbursement. 
120. Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2009). 
121. Jd. at 241 (quoting Shore Reg'] High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 
199 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (holding that federal district court failed to 
use a "due weight" standard to provide substantial reasons for refusing to credit the 
witnesses upon whom the hearing officer relied and failed to acknowledge weaknesses 
in the testimony of school district's witness who failed to explain how school's 
disciplinary system could have dealt satisfactorily with a campaign of harassment)). 
122. C.B. ex rei. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 6:35 F.:ld 1155, 
1159 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Parental reimbursement is unique among IDEA-related 
cases because both Congress and the Supreme Court have 
established guidelines for addressing the issue. Congress' 
attempt to limit reimbursement for parental placements only to 
students rece1vmg special education services has been 
circumvented. Even though parents whose children have not 
received IEPs would still have a remedy of a due process 
hearing under the IDEA, the Supreme Court in Forest Grove 
recognizes and reinforces the right of parents to make decisions 
for their children. 
More significantly, Forest Grove leaves in place a high-
stakes system for remediation of parent-school disputes that is 
based on the economic status of parents. Tuition charges (and 
residential charges, as well, in many cases) at private schools 
for students with disabilities often run into the tens of 
thousands of dollars per year. The Supreme Court failed to 
take the opportunity to reinforce the structure in place under 
the IDEA through the administrative due process hearing to 
address parent concerns. Parents who have the resources to 
pay for private placements have little in the Forest Grove 
decision to deter them from pursuing relief, and public schools 
that are struggling with financial budgets for special education 
face the possibility of lengthy litigation to resolve placement 
decisions. 
Despite some guarded optimism that parental 
reimbursement for unilateral placement might be forthcoming 
following the Supreme Court's Forest Grove decision,l23 the 
opposite result appears to have occurred. While it is much too 
early to draw broad conclusions, federal courts of appeals 
decisions thus far have set high benchmarks for parental 
reimbursement. The cost to public school districts of private 
placements, especially those that are residential, 124 can be 
substantial, and the Supreme Court's balancing-of-equities 
12:!. See, e.!{., Ralph Mawdsley, The Supreme Court's Reassessment of Parental 
Placement Under the IDEA: Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 251 ED. LAW REP. 1, 
8-11 (2010). 
121. See generally ]{alph Mawdsley, Applying the Forest Grove Balancing Test to 
Parent Reimbursement for Placement in Residential Medical Facilities, 253 ED. LAW 
REP. 521 (2010). 
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standard could become a convenient means of ensuring that 
public funds are not disbursed except according to carefully 
crafted criteria. Thus, parents may find that proving that an 
IEP has not furnished a F APE to their child will be scrutinized 
more heavily than in Burlington and Florence County. If the 
parents are unable to produce convincing evidence that their 
private placement choice is able to furnish the level and kind of 
services alleged to be deficient in the public school's IEP, the 
equities thus far seem to weigh in favor of the public school. 
Likewise, parents may find their request for reimbursement 
thwarted where they have failed to provide the notice required 
by the IDEA. 
Equally important, though, is the notion that a balancing of 
equities is a judicial concept, and federal district courts will be 
given broad latitude in deciding how that balancing is to take 
place. While administrative hearing officers will continue to 
have the responsibility of gathering the facts, the limited 
number of federal court of appeals decisions thus far suggests 
that, in the arena of parental reimbursement, federal district 
courts will have the primary role of determining how and 
where the facts fit within the balancing process. What this role 
of the federal district courts may mean for future litigation 
remains to be seen, but one may argue that, based on the post-
Forest Grove circuit court decisions thus far, parents are now 
less likely to be reimbursed for the cost of placing their 
disabled children in private schools. 
